THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

# ROUND TABLE

Lech No. 293

# CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY

*A Radio Discussion by* HERBERT BLUMER
AVERY CRAVEN *and* TRACY STREVEY

501ST BROADCAST IN COOPERATION WITH
THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY

*NUMBER 289* * * * OCTOBER 3, 1943

# *Around the Round Table . . . .*

HERBERT BLUMER, professor of sociology at the University of Chicago, is a native of St. Louis, Missouri. He received his A.B. and M.A. degrees from the University of Missouri and his Ph.D. degree from the University of Chicago. Professor Blumer served as secretary of the American Sociological Society from 1930 to 1935 and is, at the present time, a member of the Executive Committee. He is also a member of the Sociological Research Association and has been the editor of the *American Journal of Sociology* since 1940. He is the author of *Movies and Conduct* (1933), *Collective Behavior* (1938), and *Appraisal of Social Research* (1939).

AVERY O. CRAVEN, of the department of American history of the University of Chicago, was born in North Carolina and educated at Simpson College (Iowa), Harvard University, and the University of Chicago. Before joining the faculty on Chicago's Midway, he had taught at the College of Emporia, Michigan State College, and the University of Illinois. In history his field of specialization has been the study of the South and West and particularly of the Civil War. In addition, Dr. Craven is an expert on conservation and soil problems. He was president of the American Agricultural Society in 1930 and in recent years has been a lecturer for the United States Department of Agriculture. He is the co-author of *Sources of Culture in the Middle West* and author of *Soil Exhaustion in Virginia and Maryland* (1925); *Edwin Ruffin: Southerner* (1931); *To Markie* (1933); *The Repressible Conflict* (1939); and *The Coming of the Civil War* (1942).

TRACY E. STREVEY, of Northwestern University, is professor and chairman of the department of history. Professor Strevey is a native of Westfield, Illinois, and did his undergraduate work at Willamette University (Oregon), where he received his A.B. degree. He was granted his M.A. degree from the University of Washington and his Ph.D. degree from the University of Chicago. He is the author of the article on "Albert J. Beveridge" in the *Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography*, ed. Hutchinson (1937). Professor Strevey is a member of the American Historical Association, the Mississippi Valley Historical Association, and the Illinois State Historical Society.

# CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY

•

MR. CRAVEN: On September 21 the House of Representatives passed a resolution, designated as the Fulbright Resolution, dealing with our foreign policy for the days ahead.

It reads: "*Resolved*, by the House of Representatives, the Senate concurring, that the Congress hereby expresses itself as favoring the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting peace among the nations of the world, and as favoring participation by the United States therein, through its Constitutional processes."

What do you think is the significance of this resolution?

MR. STREVEY: Personally, I think that the Fulbright Resolution, and many of the others that are being passed from time to time, are significant as general statements of ideals. They are significant as establishing a pattern, and it is, moreover, especially significant that these statements are being made during a war period and that we are not waiting until the war is over.[1]

[1] An A.P. dispatch of October 4, 1943, says:

"A majority of the Senate favors international collaboration after the war, but there are so many different viewpoints that any foreign policy declaration now almost certainly would have to be vague and general in its commitments.

"That was the interpretation placed by veteran observers today on the results of an Associated Press poll in which 89 senators were asked if they would support the house-approved Fulbright peace resolution if it came to a vote in its present form.

"Of the 89, a total of 42 said they favored the principle of the measure, which would record Congress as favoring American participation through constitutional processes in 'appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and maintain a just and lasting peace among the nations of the world.' . . . . "

MR. BLUMER: I am rather impressed by the fact that the Fulbright Resolution is such a well-sounding resolution, couched in very fine, ideal language and undeniably expressive of a very genuine sentiment of the American people. However, it sounds to me a great deal like the resolution that you might expect from some Sunday-school convention, voting on behalf of a better world. I feel, in other words, that it raises some very serious questions as to exactly how well considered and well thought through is the thinking that lies behind that resolution.

MR. CRAVEN: Your reference to the Sunday-school convention reminds me that the Republicans, in their meeting up at Mackinac recently, also declared themselves for responsible participation by the United States in post-war cooperative organizations among the sovereign nations in order to prevent military aggression and to obtain permanent peace and organized justice in a free world. The American Legion, too, has declared itself in favor of an association of free sovereign nations.[2]

---

[2] The statement of the Republican Post-war Advisory Council at its Mackinac Conference which was released on September 8, 1943, said, in part: "When the War is ended, we must participate in the making of the peace. This puts upon the nation a triple responsibility.

"(*a*) We must preserve and protect all our own national interests.

"(*b*) We must aid in restoring order and decent living in a distressed world.

"(*c*) We must do our full share in a program for permanent peace among nations.

"At this time a detailed program for the accomplishment of these great objectives will be impossible, and specific commitments of this council of the Republican party, or by the nation, would be unwise. . . . . Therefore we consider it to be our duty at the beginning of our work as an advisory council of the Republican party to declare our approval of the following:

"1. Prosecution of the war by a united nation to conclusive victory over all enemies, including:

"(*a*) Disarmament and disorganization of the armed forces of the Axis.

*The University of Chicago* ROUND TABLE. *Published weekly. 10 cents a copy; full-year subscription, 52 issues, two dollars. Published by the University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. Entered as second-class matter January 3, 1930, at the post office at Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1879.*

Those things strike me as being a little bit more than just some vague Sunday-school resolution. It seems to me that they represent something of public opinion and that Congress is not just sticking its neck out, so to speak, but that Congress is responding to something rather fundamental that is going on in the American mind.

MR. BLUMER: One might very easily, of course, form the impression that you have, Craven. Indeed, one might bring into consideration here the Gallup poll that, you will recall, some time ago found that approximately 75 per cent of the American people were in favor of entering into some form of international participation. Also, approximately 74 per cent declared that they were in favor of a world police force. I agree with you that on the surface this would seem to indicate a rather strong, well-thought-out, and rather vigorous attitude upon the part of the American people. However, it is my very considered opinion that that is more or less of a camouflage. I feel that actually if we do investigate and dig down beneath this expression of sentiment upon the part of the American people, we will find that it really is an expression of a rather vague feeling.

MR. CRAVEN: I grant you that, but, on the other hand, I would take it more seriously than you do. You seem merely to say that the American people are sick and that, therefore, they are repentant. I have a feeling that there is a growing realization on the part of the American people that we can no longer live as we have lived in the past and that some sort of participation in world affairs is necessary. That is, not only have we become sicker but we have also become a bit wiser as well.

MR. STREVEY: I would like to see Blumer press the point that he

---

"(*b*) Disqualification of the Axis to construct facilities for the manufacture of the implements of war.

"(*c*) Permanent maintenance of trained and well-equipped armed forces at home.

"2. Responsible participation by the United States in post-war cooperative organization among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and to attain permanent peace with organized justice in a free world. . . . ."

## VOTE ON THE FULBRIGHT RESOLUTION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES




was making a moment ago concerning this confusion in the public mind.

MR. BLUMER: In doing so, we are really talking about the first great problem, it seems to me—namely, what the difficulties are that exist in public thinking in this country with reference to the whole problem of trying to establish a foreign policy for our country.

I have been saying, and I very frankly believe, that the American thinking on this matter is characterized essentially by vagueness, for one thing; secondly, that the thinking is still fundamentally nationalistically orientated, and, thirdly, that it is a sort of composite of the views of a whole variety of groups in this country who, among themselves, differ so much that they might come really to open dissension if a very persistent effort were made to clarify this expression.

MR. CRAVEN: I grant that, but I will not discount the fact that Congress has passed a resolution; that the Republicans have passed resolutions; that other groups have passed resolutions—all pointing in the same general direction. It seems to me that, while there is going to be division over concrete problems later, nevertheless, owing to the fact that these groups have committed themselves, it is going to be a good deal more difficult to back out. Congressmen are not inclined to be open to the charge of inconsistency. Thus, having taken a position here, I think that it means something rather concrete for the future.

MR. BLUMER: That is quite true. On the other hand, you will agree with me that Congress is very responsive to public opinion. If it be true that the public opinion in this country on the issue that we are discussing is one which is not clearly formulated and not well thought through, then it would seem to me rather evident that, given certain circumstances, Congress might indeed reverse itself.

I would like to supplement and amplify somewhat the declaration that I have been making about the fact that the thinking in this country is vague on this matter. I would like to call attention, first of all, to the fact that if one aligns himself with the expression as contained in the Fulbright Resolution, he is confronted with certain concrete problems which are unanswered—let us say, whether or not there should be established a state of world free trade which would permit foreign products to enter this country to sell and compete against our own goods; whether we should allow immigrants to come into this country in numbers; or whether we would be willing to allow the Panama Canal to be internationalized and taken out of our possession. The point that I am trying to make is that the expression that we see in the Fulbright Resolution is not one which is really based upon a well-thought-out, well-considered realization of everything that is implied.

MR. STREVEY: Of course, what you are actually charging is that our foreign policy, if we have one, is largely nationalistic; that we

## SHALL WE HAVE PERMANENT MILITARY ALLIANCES?

**WITH RUSSIA:**




**WITH GREAT BRITAIN:**




THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE PICTOGRAPH —Kayser

In the United States the question asked by the Gallup pollers was as follows: "After the war, should the United States and Russia make a permanent military alliance, that is, agree to come to each other's defense immediately if the other is attacked at any future time?" A similar question was asked by the American Institute of Public Opinion for Great Britain: "After the war, should the United States and Great Britain make a permanent military alliance, that is, agree to come to each other's defense immediately if the other is attacked at any future time?" (Gallup poll, September 13, 1943).

act from expediency and from self-interest; and that any foreign policy, of course, has to take that into consideration. But I am sure Craven agrees that, in looking back over our history, there are certain broad fundamentals of American foreign policy.

MR. BLUMER: I would like to hear those.

MR. CRAVEN: I will say not only that there are certain great fundamentals in American policy but that the first step toward facing these concrete problems—and perhaps getting somewhere with them—is the acceptance of certain rather large general principles. Therefore, I am inclined to take the Fulbright Resolution, and these other resolutions, more seriously than you do, because I view them as the first step toward the facing of these other concrete problems in a practical way.

Let me give you what I mean as far as the existence of certain broad policies in the American past, which are, incidentally, just as vague and just as nationalistic, perhaps, as the Fulbright Resolution, but which on occasion have been turned into very concrete policies and very effective policies.

First of all, nothing could be more vague, perhaps, than the general American tendency to sympathize with democracies everywhere. Yet, through American history, that has been a thing that could be counted upon. In the second place, there has always been a sentiment against permanent alliances, as Washington called them, or entangling alliances, as Jefferson called them. Then, there is the Monroe Doctrine—vague in some ways, in fact, so vague that it can be interpreted in different ways at different times. There has been a policy for the freedom of the seas and finally, perhaps, I might even include the whole attitude of isolationism.

These are all vague things. They are way up in the air sometimes, but, nevertheless, where the occasion has required, these have been brought down to earth and have been made very effective and very concrete things.

MR. BLUMER: Craven, may I say two things in response to your

interesting remarks? First of all, just the fact that these things you have mentioned and the Fulbright Resolution are both vague and simply because these five points have operated effectively does not necessarily mean that the Fulbright Resolution will do so likewise. However, that is a logical difficulty that I do not think is important.

MR. CRAVEN: I am not saying that the mere vagueness of the Fulbright Resolution puts it in line with these other things. I am saying only that certain rather fundamental attitudes and sentiments which the American people have had and which are no different perhaps from this one, and do not represent anything different from what this one represents, have become very effective. It has been possible for leaders to arise and appeal to these sentiments, vague as they are, and to make them into concrete policies when the necessity has arisen.

MR. BLUMER: Granted. But let us see whether Strevey will agree with me on this rejoinder to your remarks. As you mentioned these five points, what impressed me very significantly was that the last four of them—namely, the sentiment for permanent alliances, our Monroe Doctrine, our policy on behalf of freedom of the seas, and our historical following of an isolationist position—stand, in my judgment, for substantially very nationalistically inclined interests, whereas the Fulbright Resolution is orientated in a very different direction. What do you think, Strevey?

MR. STREVEY: I am not so sure. It seems to me that these points can be broken down into specific applications which are partly nationalistic and partly internationalistic. For example, take the one concerning the sympathy of the American people for democracies everywhere. That has been applied to Latin America; it has been applied as far away as Greece; it was the great slogan that carried us, to a large degree, into the last World War.

MR. BLUMER: Yes, but there are many instances where our country has been confronted by some particular situation abroad and where it became necessary for us to act on the basis of national in-

terests when we were quite willing to forego following out a policy based on democratic sympathy.

MR. CRAVEN: Don't misunderstand me and think that I believe all these things are going to be handled in a strictly unselfish sort of a way. I suspect that any American foreign policy is going to be more or less nationalistic. I would expect an English policy to be more or less one that was nationalistic as far as England was concerned.

What I am trying to say is that if you do have any broad, generally accepted principle of that kind, it does form a background upon which some leader may make his appeal. For instance, if we are really interested in peace (as everybody seems to be), if we have really reached the point where at least in sentiment we begin to accept the idea of an international police force, I think that we are making progress and that we are laying a background on which leaders can make their appeal. We thus can get something from Congress, perhaps, of a foreign policy that will see us into the future and to a better peace than we have had.

MR. STREVEY: I think that we must not lose sight of the fact, when we are talking of foreign policy, that we are talking of a rather broad, general program which is not static. Again referring to these examples, all these so-called sentiments have undergone change. The Monroe Doctrine has undergone at least three changes since its inception in 1823.

MR. BLUMER: The only concluding remark that I would wish to make is that it seems to me that the Fulbright Resolution stands for a new policy. It is fundamentally international in character. I infer from what you have said, Craven, and indeed from your remarks, Strevey, that these instances from our past history are actually instances that tend to support the fact that we have acted on the basis of national interest. The problem that confronts us is whether we can get a policy organized on an international position.

MR. CRAVEN: It seems to me that we are working definitely in

the interest of our own individual interests when we work for international peace. This is a step in that practical direction.

MR. STREVEY: Gentlemen, we are faced with the fact that foreign affairs within the United States are delegated under the Constitution to the President and Congress. It seems to me that that raises the second general question for our discussion—namely, the relationship of democratic procedure to the making of foreign policy.

MR. CRAVEN: I would like to suggest that the words "democratic procedure" are the important thing, because, in light of the way in which our State Department is organized and has worked and the way in which our foreign policy has been carried out, it has been rather difficult to call it "democratic." We have done rather well as far as our domestic policy is concerned, but our foreign policy appears to require a bit of efficiency that does not always go with democracy—a bit of secrecy sometimes that does not lend itself to the democratic procedure. Perhaps, also, it has required a special kind of knowledge that the average American has not had. For these reasons it has been rather difficult to make the congressional procedure a democratic one.

MR. STREVEY: We can make that even more concrete. For example, there is the two-thirds rule by which treaties must be ratified by the Senate. Certainly, within a democratic framework that means that the rule of the minority may well prevail.[3]

MR. BLUMER: As I understand it, it is possible for one-third of the Senate plus one vote to completely break or nullify any action that might be advocated, let us say, by the President.

MR. STREVEY: Exactly.

MR. CRAVEN: What of it? What do you suggest in regard to that? That is constitutional; it is part of our Constitution.

---

[3] Article II, sec. 2, of the Constitution of the United States says: "He [the President] shall have power by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur. . . . ."

MR. STREVEY: It is constitutional, and it would not be easy to make a change; but I think the fact remains that if through constitutional processes, through an amendment to the Constitution, we could provide for a majority ratification of a treaty, even by both houses of Congress, we would have gone a long way forward toward expediting this relationship.

MR. CRAVEN: I would like to add that, while I recognize that this rule has been a handicap to direct democratic procedure, it has been gotten around a good deal by our Presidents. Not all of our Presidents have been handicapped by the two-thirds rule. There are a number of cases that could be cited to show that the President has not been thwarted in his foreign policy by the one-third-plus-one-member vote.[4]

MR. STREVEY: I suppose that you are referring to the fact that the President may resort to executive agreements. Many Presidents have done so. They have resorted to joint resolutions to accomplish the ratification of a treaty. But I think that it is a rather sad commentary on our whole problem of foreign relations that the President must resort to many of these devices and techniques in order to accomplish a particular purpose.

MR. CRAVEN: Yes. But let me call attention, for instance, to the Boxer Indemnity Protocol; the United Nations' Agreement of January, 1942; or even such an important thing as the annexation of Texas, which was accomplished by joint resolution only. Here

---

[4] "The number of treaties and executive agreements have increased with the vast expansion of world affairs, reflecting the growing participation of the United States. . . . . For treaties the mid-way point of the enumeration coincides rather closely with the advent of the twentieth century (beginning 1903); for the executive agreements listed the median year is 1920. More executive agreements have entered into force since the World War than treaties since the war with Spain which inducted the United States into large-scale world affairs . . . ." (Wallace McClure, *International Executive Agreements* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1941], p. 4). See illustration on page 12 for summary history of the use of treaties and executive agreements.

## Treaties and Executive Agreements during One Hundred and Fifty Years under the Constitution, April 30, 1789, to April 30, 1939*




* Wallace McClure, *International Executive Agreements* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941).

were very important foreign affairs handled by our President and carried forward to success without the two-thirds interference.[5]

When one faces the difficulties of changing the Constitution—for it is going to require the re-education of the American people in that way—it seems to me that one is up against a rather difficult problem.

MR. BLUMER: I would rather agree to that, too, knowing something, as you two gentlemen do, about the difficulties that tend to arise whenever we do seek to bring about a constitutional change and of the way in which different interest groups begin to play up shibboleths and to appeal to the passions and prejudices of the people. We must realize that the possibility of getting this constitutional amendment, at least in time for our operation in the present situation, is very remote.

MR. STREVEY: Opposed to that, the matter of executive agreements depends, to a large degree, on the continuity of the administration.

MR. CRAVEN: I grant you that there is a good deal of difficulty to be faced, and particularly if we are going to make treaties, because, as a rule, we have sent our treaties to our Senate and our Senate's two-thirds has been essential. But isn't it possible to have something like joint committees and to have an arrangement whereby we could bring departments closer together for cooperation?

MR. BLUMER: That interests me very much, particularly since our topic today is "Congress and Foreign Policy." I would like to have a few other comments made, for my own personal clarification, on what the other difficulties are that confront Congress in participating effectively in helping to organize a foreign policy. What do you think? Do you feel that there are other difficulties?

MR. CRAVEN: Yes. Constitutionally, the State Department has

[5] The Boxer Indemnity Protocol and the United Nations agreement were both executive agreements.

no standing. The original idea, if I am not mistaken, was that the President should confer and get advice from the Senate. Washington went, on one occasion, and was treated in such a cold way that he said he would never go back. Therefore, he began to turn to his Secretary of State for advice in the matter of foreign affairs. Thus there has developed a procedure that does not have constitutional standing. The President may rely on the State Department to a large degree, as some Presidents have done, or he can ignore it.

MR. BLUMER: The question of the State Department in the topic that we are discussing is one which is indeed very important. I think that we ought to turn to that quite soon for a rather careful analysis.

However, before we do that, I would like to ask whether or not you think that one of the difficulties of Congress' functioning effectively in the formation of a foreign policy is due to its rather unpleasant predicament, on one hand, of not being able to get any guidance from American public opinion and, on the other hand, of not having access to information as to what is going on elsewhere in the world.

MR. STREVEY: Those are good points, particularly the last one. That is, Congress has an index in terms of the Gallup poll from the public, but it seems to me that, by all means, we should work toward the establishment of some joint congressional committee to cooperate with the State Department and, with the President, to be given information which I think too often is lacking.

MR. CRAVEN: That is just the point that I had in mind. The State Department does not have any official relationship to Congress, and the Congress does not have the opportunity of getting the information which the State Department has and upon which it determines action.

In the second place, the State Department has, on the other side of it, the President, who may rely on his Secretary of State to a very large degree—as, for instance, our Monroe Doctrine was the work

# TREATIES SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE WHICH HAVE NOT GONE INTO EFFECT, 1789–1931*

Accepted, but Failed for Another Reason

Senate Amendments Not Acceptable to Other Signer

Rejected by Senate

Withdrawn by President

No Final Action Taken

Submitted for Information, Not Action

* In the years 1789–1931, 228 treaties did not go into effect (Department of State, *List of Treaties Submitted to the Senate, 1789–1931, Which Have Not Gone into Force* [Washington: Government Printing Office, October 1, 1932]).

". . . . During the period of precisely a century and a half, ending April 30, 1939, the President had put in force, 'by and with the Advice and Consent' of at least two thirds of the Senators voting, about 800 treaties (there were in addition 12 treaties before the Constitution was in force) and had concluded more than 200 other instruments intended to become treaties by two votes to one, but which for various reasons had failed to enter into operation. More than 100 of these were either rejected by the vote of the Senate, or, much more usually, were never acted upon at all. Others failed because of Senatorial amendment or reservation . . . ." (McClure, *op. cit.*, p. 5).

of a Secretary of State. Webster, as Secretary of State, carried on his affairs almost independent of the President. The President gave him a free hand. On the other hand, many times the President has stepped in—as in the case, for instance, of Wilson, who stepped in and took the position that caused Bryan to resign. When Lansing came in, Lansing was little more than something of a dignified assistant, and the President took over the powers. Thus, the Department of State is put in that peculiar position where it is neither one thing nor the other.[6]

MR. BLUMER: I see that we are now into the discussion of our third major problem—namely, the role of the State Department in the formation of a foreign policy and something about its present position. You know, Craven, as I know, that, in recent weeks particularly, there has been a great deal of criticism of the State Department on this very matter.

MR. CRAVEN: Yes, a good deal—perhaps justly; perhaps a good deal of it just gossip.

MR. BLUMER: I would just like to say this—make a little bit of an apology, if you please—on behalf of the State Department in light of this criticism. It seems to me that the charge levied against the State Department that it is acting upon the basis of expediency —that it is improvising instead of following out some objectives that have been laid down in advance—is something that is perhaps inescapable in our modern world such as it is. We find ourselves in a world in which changing events are moving rapidly. We do not know exactly their direction, and, accordingly, it becomes necessary for the practical man to act expediently enough to make commitments, not knowing in advance what may happen.

---

[6] President Wilson and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan did not agree on the policy that should be pursued in regard to aiding the cause of the Allies or upon the position that the United States should take in regard to the first World War. This disagreement resulted in the resignation of Bryan, who was replaced by Lansing.

MR. STREVEY: Doesn't that also tie in with the fact that possibly the State Department fears Congress? I am wondering whether or not, in terms of this relationship, the State Department can well depend upon what Congress will do. Many times Congress has blocked policies, or it has amended policies that the State Department has advocated. The Secretary of State cannot go upon the floor of Congress to debate. He can be called before special committees, of course, but there is a lack of communication.

MR. CRAVEN: That is true, but here is something I think that we ought to consider. In the United States, not knowing much about foreign affairs, we have been inclined to expect the State Department to take over and wisely handle and know all about these things. We have been particularly dependent on these groups, and, as I have said, we have depended on the group that has been short of power on one side from the President, who can take away its powers, short on the other side from Congress, who can defeat its action. The State Department has been put in an almost impossible position.

If the American people themselves had some well-defined foreign policies in mind—things that they could support—perhaps they would find that the State Department would be a far more effective leader than when we simply sit back and make ourselves critics of the State Department.

MR. BLUMER: I quite agree with that. It seems to me that it sets our present situation, as far as this issue is concerned, with a somewhat unfavorable character to it. In other words, if we think, on the one hand, that the state of thinking in this country on this issue is not very clear; if we further agree that Congress is not very clear on the matter; and now, in the light of your remarks, if we know that the State Department is somewhat hamstrung and not very clear itself, it would seem to raise a rather pessimistic picture as to what might be anticipated in our ability to organize a good foreign policy.

MR. CRAVEN: Some people have gone so far as to suggest that

## SECTIONAL OPINION ON PERMANENT ALLIANCES

Source: Gallup poll, September 13, 1943

we eliminate the State Department. They have suggested that, in order to democratize our foreign policy, it would be necessary for

Congress to return to the old position of the adviser to the President and to make the State Department little more than an administrative body. That is how far that criticism has gone.

MR. STREVEY: Isn't that the result of the confusion which is carried over into the minds of the people? For example, there is the recent resignation of an Undersecretary of State and the explanation given as due to the ill-health of his wife. A great many people have immediately reached the conclusion that something is wrong.

MR. BLUMER: Of course, we are aware, obviously, of these criticisms and the rumors that are spreading around now. I feel that what is really fundamental is the fact that we have here the public, the Congress, and the State Department, none of them apparently being very clear on what is needed, and, consequently, none of them being able to give very much direction or assistance to the others.

MR. CRAVEN: Might I sum it up by saying that we have relied to an unusual degree for foreign affairs upon the State Department. In the second place, while we have been relying upon it, we have not had the confidence in the State Department as a democratic body that we would have, perhaps, in Congress as such. Therefore, we refer to our foreign policy as being undemocratic; but it seems to me that, underneath all this, there lies another question which ought to be faced. These resolutions, and what we have been talking about as a foreign policy, all imply that the United States has begun to move into a new sphere of international relationships; that we are beginning to feel, somehow or other, that we must put an end to war; and that we must take the steps, like the formation of an international police force, in order to get those things.

MR. BLUMER: What do you think is implied in that? I mean what sort of price do we have to pay in order to achieve that?

MR. CRAVEN: The point that I am suggesting is merely that if we are going to have those things, we are going to have to pay the price of having our sovereignty, to a certain extent, clipped. The

## METHODS USED IN MAKING AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER NATIONS

1. *By executive agreement.*

2. *By a treaty, initiated by the President and passed by a two-thirds vote of the Senate.*

3. *By joint resolution of both houses of Congress.*

question, as you raised it in the beginning, is whether these vague statements do mean that we are willing to restrict our sovereignty to a degree. Do these vague statements mean that we are willing to

get only a minimum number of things that we, as a nation, hold for our security and for our well-being and that we are going to fight if we cannot have those things defended and supported? Are we willing to pay the price in order to get those things supported by sacrificing something in our sovereignty? Are we going to pay the price, which is the second part of it all, of supporting other nations' minimum requirements as well?

MR. STREVEY: Craven, you have put the case. You have said that we must pay the price. Specifically, your idea of limitation of sovereignty interests me more than anything else you have said. What do you think that means for the American people?

MR. CRAVEN: That means, as far as the American people are concerned, that certain things which we have considered to be our own domestic affairs—such as our tariffs, such as the matter of even the Monroe Doctrine, our rights in the Pacific and in the Atlantic (these are certain definite things that we have felt were our own business and no one else's business)—somehow or other have now become the business of other people and that we must accommodate our demands to other people's demands—a thing the American people have not been inclined to do.

MR. BLUMER: But would you agree with me, since we are speaking about Congress and the foreign policy and since we started off with a consideration of the Fulbright Resolution, that the Fulbright Resolution in itself gives one no indication as to what action either Congress or the American people will take on these specific things that you mention?

MR. CRAVEN: My point is that if we begin to realize that we must have a foreign policy and that the American mind is prepared for some leader to arise and to begin to formulate a foreign policy for the United States in such terms that it will be acceptable not only to the American people but to the other nations of the world on whom we must depend to a certain extent if we are going to have

world peace for the support of those policies, then we have gained something.

MR. BLUMER: In so far as your last remarks are concerned, I agree with you that I derive some hope from what you say, because I think that the very fact that American thinking at the present time is of this vague character makes it possible for some vigorous leadership to lay down a path that we might tread.

MR. STREVEY: In fact, I hope that the American public will keep ahead and force that leadership into operation.

MR. CRAVEN: It seems to me that we have many times been able to get a foreign policy from the President; we have derived it sometimes from the Secretary of State; sometimes, even, it has come from Congress.

The point is that, until the American people are prepared to pay the price for permanent peace in the sacrifice of certain of the things we have held dear before, we are not going to get it, and it will be only the vague dream that the Fulbright Resolution seems to promise.

*The* ROUND TABLE, *oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entirely without script, although participants meet in advance, prepare a topical outline, and exchange data and views. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company. The supplementary information in this transcript has been developed by staff research and is not to be considered as representing the opinions of the* ROUND TABLE *speakers.*

## *More on This Topic*


DENNISON, ELEANOR E., *The Senate Foreign Relations Committee.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1942. *How this committee is organized, how it operates, and what influence it has exercised on American foreign policy.*

"Fulbright's Resolution," *Life*, June 28, 1943.

HATCH, C. A., "Unite for Peace Now," *Collier's*, August 14, 1943. *Senator Hatch says that "there exists grave danger to any post-war program as conditions are in the United States Senate today."*

JESSUP, JOHN K., "America and the Future," *Life*, September 20, 1943. *A plea for a foreign policy which wins security through armaments and alliance, promotes trade, and extends the principle of individual freedom under law.*

JONES, JOSEPH M., "A Modern Foreign Policy," *Fortune*, August, 1943. *Argues that we must achieve a foreign policy with responsibility to the source of power, the people of the United States.*

———, "The U.S. State Department," *ibid.*, September, 1943. *Asks what can be done about the inadequate machinery, procedures, and attitudes of the State Department.*

KOHN, HANS, "Realities of War and Peace," *Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1943. *Argues for a nationalistic policy of enlightened self-interest.*

LA FOLLETTE, ROBERT M., "A Senator Looks at Congress," *Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1943. *Recommends a more effective organization of Congress.*

PEFFER, NATHANIEL, "The Split in Our Foreign Policy," *Harper's*, August, 1943. *States the problem of democratic control of American foreign policy.*

WRIGHT, QUINCY, *The Control of American Foreign Relations.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1922. *An authoritative study of the processes of American foreign policy.*

YOUNG, ROLAND, *This Is Congress.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1943. *An analysis of Congress by the former secretary of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.*

## What Do *You* Think?

1. Do you agree with Walter Lippmann's thesis that the United States has been without a foreign policy in recent years? Why? What is your definition of the concept "foreign policy"?
2. To what extent does traditional isolationism stand in the way of American participation in post-war international organization? Would you agree with some who say that traditional isolationism in America has proved actually to be the practice of "balance-of-power politics"?
3. To what extent is American foreign policy subject to effective democratic control? In what ways can American foreign policy be made responsible to the American people? Do you favor the organization of a joint congressional committee to work with the State Department and the President?
4. Do you think that the structure of American government is such that a long-term foreign policy cannot be agreed upon and established? Is the only effective way that a democracy can exercise control over foreign policy to be found in the establishment of long-term principle and policy?
5. In your opinion what are the merits of the Fulbright Resolution? Do you think the Senate should express its view on post-war collaboration at this time?
6. In what way is the conduct of foreign relations a different thing from the politics of domestic issues? What policy does public opinion in your community support? Has public opinion the same opportunity for leadership on foreign-policy issues that it exercises on domestic issues?
7. What is the history of the struggle between President and Senate for the control of the conduct of foreign relations? Do you think that a majority of both houses of Congress is a more satisfactory check on foreign policy than the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds approval of a Senate quorum?
8. In summary, what would you regard as the most important obstacles to the formulation of a clear and popular American foreign policy for the post-war world?

# *The People Say....*

*The following letters are representative of the views expressed by the* ROUND TABLE *audience on "The Challenge of Government-owned War Plants and Supplies," broadcast September 26, 1943.*

*

## Full of "Dynamite"

.... This discussion—if you will permit the expression—is full of "dynamite." I should like to hear much, much more regarding it and feel that the public in general is entitled to expressions from the government and the public alike.—*A listener from Bloomfield Hills, Michigan.*

*

## Most Informative

.... Incidentally, may I say that I considered that discussion one of the most informative ones that I have heard in a long time? The subject is so vital and so sweeping in its scope as to challenge the imagination of the forward-looking American.—*A listener from Jamestown, North Dakota.*

*

## Human Rights Come First

.... We are having too much emphasis on economics today. Fascism and naziism are sheer materialism put before human rights, and they did not receive much hindrance from their external equivalents. Their complete defeat lies in putting human rights foremost. Therein lies our country's responsibility to mankind. Economic processes, like power, are not foremost aims in themselves, but only worth while as a means to justice. Let them fall in line behind what mankind has been marching toward for so many thousand years.—*A listener from Garden City, Kansas.*

*

## Must Sell Plants

.... It is my opinion that unless the government *sells* all its industrial plants, even at a tremendous loss, the way of private business will be *out* after a fashion of public utilities. The great American stockholder in all investments will likewise be reduced as are the investments in utilities. The loss may seem huge, but the subsidy will be much greater.—*A listener from Dearborn, Michigan.*

*

## Build New Communities

.... Every one of the government-built plants could become, when converted to peacetime pursuits, the nucleus for a producing, cooperative, self-sufficient community. There is almost no necessary activity for such a community, and for the organization of it, that has not been acquired as a spe-

cialized ability by some of the men in service or in war industry. Hundreds of such in industrial communities could be organized by the men themselves if they were given some concrete images of such a potentiality in order to crystallize their own constructive imaginations. Can't some of us render this service to the men who are rendering such service to us? . . . .—*A listener from Sharon, Massachusetts.*

*

## Important Subject

It was indeed a very interesting broadcast, and I congratulate those responsible for the selection of the program because it certainly is a subject which is most interesting and important to the citizens of the United States.—*A listener from New York, New York.*

*

## Government Is Competent

Businessmen's panicky fear of having government remain in business after the war reminds one of a very apt remark of Thurman Arnold: "We'd rather like to perish under a so-called 'good principle' than prosper under a so-called 'bad' one."

There is nothing inherently bad about government in business. We have already accepted this principle in a number of instances, such as post office, schools, turnpikes, electric power, insurance, engineering works, and others. We shall be ready to broaden this scope as soon as the time becomes ripe for it and the people begin to realize that the government is quite competent to do this efficiently. . . . .—*A listener from Jacksonville, Florida.*

*

## What about the Yardstick?

I noted with considerable interest the remarks by one of the speakers who suggested a possible solution of the question by having the government operate some of the plants with the idea of possibly using the results of this operation as a yardstick which would be used to measure the permitted price of the similar articles produced by free industry.

In the talk there was no mention made as to whether or not for this government-operated plant there would be set up charges against the output that would take care of the taxes that private industry would have to pay in making and marketing the same goods. . . . . I do know that if the only charges against the goods produced would be bare labor, power expense, and such, and if the taxes were entirely eliminated, there would be nothing fair about the transaction in any way, shape, or manner.—*A listener from Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.*

# ROUND TABLE NETWORK OF 119 STATIONS

| City | Call Letters | Kilocycles | City | Call Letters | Kilocycles |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1:30 P.M. EASTERN WAR TIME** | | | | | |
| Allentown, Pa. | WSAN | 1470 | Martinsville, Va. | WMVA | 1450 |
| Altoona, Pa. | WFBG | 1340 | Miami, Fla. | WIOD | 610 |
| Asheville, N.C. | WISE | 1400 | New York, N.Y. | WEAF | 660 |
| Atlanta, Ga. | WSB | 750 | Norfolk, Va. | WTAR | 790 |
| Bluefield, W.Va. | WHIS | 1440 | Philadelphia, Pa. | KYW | 1060 |
| Boston, Mass. | WBZ | 1030 | Pittsburgh, Pa. | KDKA | 1020 |
| Charleston, S.C. | WTMA | 1250 | Portland, Me. | WCSH | 970 |
| Charleston, W.Va. | WGKV | 1490 | Providence, R.I. | WJAR | 920 |
| Charlotte, N.C. | WSOC | 1240 | Raleigh, N.C. | WPTF | 680 |
| Cincinnati, Ohio | WLW | 700 | Reading, Pa. | WEEU | 850 |
| Clarksburg, W.Va. | WBLK | 1400 | Richmond, Va. | WMBG | 1380 |
| Cleveland, Ohio | WTAM | 1100 | Rochester, N.Y. | WHAM | 1180 |
| Columbia, S.C. | WIS | 560 | Savannah, Ga. | WSAV | 1340 |
| Detroit, Mich. | WWJ | 950 | Springfield, Mass. | WBZA | 1030 |
| Florence, S.C. | WOLS | 1230 | Springfield, Ohio | WIZE | 1340 |
| Grand Rapids, Mich. | WOOD | 1300 | Syracuse, N.Y. | WSYR | 570 |
| Greenville, S.C. | WFBC | 1330 | Tampa, Fla. | WFLA | 970 |
| Greenwood, S.C. | WCRS | 1450 | Toledo, Ohio | WSPD | 740 |
| Jacksonville, Fla. | WJAX | 930 | Washington, D.C. | WRC | 980 |
| Johnstown, Pa. | WJAC | 1400 | Williamsport, Pa. | WRAK | 1400 |
| Harrisburg, Pa. | WKBO | 1230 | Wilmington, Del. | WDEL | 1150 |
| Lakeland, Fla. | WLAK | 1340 | Winston-Salem, N.C. | WSJS | 600 |
| Lima, Ohio | WLOK | 1240 | York, Pa. | WORK | 1350 |
| **12:30 P.M. CENTRAL WAR TIME** | | | | | |
| Birmingham, Ala. | WBRC | 960 | Louisville, Ky. | WAVE | 970 |
| Bismarck, N.D. | KFYR | 550 | Madison, Wis. | WIBA | 1310 |
| Chicago, Ill. | WMAQ | 670 | Mankato, Minn. | KYSM | 1230 |
| Dallas, Texas | WFAA | 820 | Memphis, Tenn. | WMC | 790 |
| Des Moines, Iowa | WHO | 1040 | Mobile, Ala. | WALA | 1410 |
| Duluth, Minn., and Superior, Wis. | WEBC | 1320 | Montgomery, Ala. | WSFA | 1440 |
| Eau Claire, Wis. | WEAU | 1070 | Nashville, Tenn. | WSM | 650 |
| El Paso, Texas | KSTM | 1380 | New Orleans, La. | WSMB | 1350 |
| Evansville, Ind. | WGBF | 1280 | Oklahoma City, Okla. | WKY | 930 |
| Fargo, N.D. | WDAY | 970 | Omaha, Neb. | WOW | 590 |
| Fort Wayne, Ind. | WOWO | 1190 | Rochester, Minn. | KROC | 1340 |
| Hattiesburg, Miss. | WFOR | 1400 | St. Cloud, Minn. | KFAM | 1450 |
| Hibbing, Minn. | WMFG | 1240 | Shreveport, La. | KTBS | 1480 |
| Houston, Texas | KPRC | 950 | Sioux Falls, S.D. | KSOO | 1140 |
| Indianapolis, Ind. | WIRE | 1430 | Springfield, Mo. | KGBX | 1260 |
| Kansas City, Mo. | WDAF | 610 | Terre Haute, Ind. | WBOW | 1230 |
| Kingsport, Tenn. | WKPT | 1400 | Tulsa, Okla. | KVOO | 1170 |
| La Crosse, Wis. | WKBH | 1410 | Virginia, Minn. | WHLB | 1400 |
| Little Rock, Ark. | KARK | 920 | Wichita, Kan. | KANS | 1240 |
| **11:30 A.M. MOUNTAIN WAR TIME** | | | | | |
| Albuquerque, N.M. | KOB | 770 | Phoenix, Ariz. | KTAR | 620 |
| Billings, Mont. | KGHL | 790 | Pocatello, Ida. | KSEI | 930 |
| Boise, Ida. | KIDO | 1380 | Safford, Ariz. | KGLU | 1450 |
| Bozeman, Mont. | KRBM | 1450 | Salt Lake City, Utah | KDYL | 1320 |
| Butte, Mont. | KGIR | 1370 | Tucson, Ariz. | KVOA | 1290 |
| Denver, Colo. | KOA | 850 | Twin Falls, Ida. | KTFI | 1270 |
| Helena, Mont. | KPFA | 1240 | Yuma, Ariz. | KYUM | 1240 |
| **10:30 A.M. PACIFIC WAR TIME** | | | | | |
| Bakersfield, Cal. | KERN | 1410 | Sacramento, Cal. | KFBK | 1530 |
| Fresno, Cal. | KMJ | 580 | San Diego, Cal. | KFSD | 600 |
| Los Angeles, Cal. | KFI | 640 | Seattle, Wash. | KOMO | 950 |
| Medford, Ore. | KMED | 1440 | Spokane, Wash. | KHQ | 590 |
| Portland, Ore. | KGW | 620 | | | |
| **STATIONS CARRYING ROUND TABLE BY TRANSCRIPTION** | | | | | |
| Buffalo, N.Y. | WBEN | 930 | Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minn. | KSTP | 1500 |
| Columbus, Ohio | WCOL | 1230 | St. Louis, Mo. | KSD | 550 |
| Milwaukee, Wis. | WTMJ | 620 | San Francisco, Cal. | KPO | 680 |
| Minneapolis, Minn. | WLB | 770 | Schenectady, N.Y. | WGY | 810 |
| **BY TRANSCRIPTION VIA SHORT WAVE** | | | | | |
| Anchorage, Alaska | KFQD | 790 | Juneau, Alaska | KINY | 1450 |
| Fairbanks, Alaska | KFAR | 610 | Ketchikan, Alaska | KTAN | 930 |

# TRANSCRIPT SUBSCRIPTIONS

**ONE YEAR'S SUBSCRIPTION.....$2.00 SIX MONTHS'.....$1.00**

**FOR SINGLE COPIES OF THE BROADCASTS LISTED BELOW SEND TEN CENTS IN COIN TO THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS.**

**LISTS**

*of 1938-41 Transcripts Still in Print Will Be Sent upon Request. Students and Teachers Will Find These Issues To Be Valuable Commentaries upon Events of the Period.*

No.

**1942**

204. *Labor Policies in Wartime*
208. *Civilian Defense*
223. *China*
229. *Should We Discuss the Next Peace Now?*
230. *Political Reconstruction of the Post-war World*
231. *Economic Requisites of a Durable Peace*
232. *Challenge of the Four Freedoms*
233. *Health in Wartime*
241. *Manpower*
243. *France*
244. *Crisis Administration*
245. *The Challenge to Local Government*
246. *After One Year of War—What Have We Learned?*
247. *Italy*
248. *Social Security: Challenge to Democracy*
249. *Woodrow Wilson: Prophet or Visionary*
250. *Things To Come: How Science May Shape the Next Twenty-five Years*
252. *Are We Well Informed?*
254. *American Foreign Policy: Principle versus Expediency*

**1943**

255. *The Farmer and Victory*
256. *Germany: Its Education and Re-education*
257. *Russia as an Ally in War and Peace*
258. *The Airplane and the Future*

No.

259. *Bigger and Better Taxes?*
260. *Is This a Conservative War?*
261. *Education for Freedom*
263. *The Senate and Foreign Policy*
264. *Thomas Jefferson and the Meaning of Democracy*
265. *What About the Trade Agreements?*
266. *Morals in Wartime*
267. *The Future of Empire*
268. *Is the Good Neighbor Policy Here To Stay?*
269. *Are We Holding the Line?*
270. *The Strategy of Food*
271. *The Future of Europe*
272. *Death of the Comintern*
273. *Requisites of a Durable Peace*
274. *The States and Post-war America*
275. *Prices and Your Pocketbook*
276. *Race Tensions*
277. *Cartels and the Peace*
278. *War and the Middle Class*
279. *Puerto Rico*
280. *The Liberation of Italy*
281. *America's Place in the World*
282. *The Economic System—Today and Tomorrow*
283. *The Domestic Front*
284. *The Meaning of the War*
285. *When Johnny Comes Marching Home*
286. *Russia's Foreign Policy*
287. *Soldiers, Civilians, and the Vote*
288. *The Challenge of Government-owned War Plants and Supplies.* September 26

*Any Round Table Transcript May Be Purchased in Lots of 100 or More at Special Rates upon Request*

to the

**ROUND TABLE**

**BROADCAST**



the

**ROUND TABLE**

**TRANSCRIPT**

regularly for discussions by the experts.

**SUBSCRIBE NOW!**

---

I would like to receive the ROUND TABLE transcript regularly. Please enter my name on the subscription list—

☐ for six months at $1.00
☐ for one year at $2.00

Name.....

Address.....

City..... State.....

☐ I am enclosing the correct amount
☐ Please send me a bill

**A University of Chicago Round Table Broadcast**

**OCTOBER 10, 1943**

# WAR MEDICINE

•

**DR. ALEXANDER BRUNSCHWIG,** School of Medicine, University of Chicago

**DR. MORRIS FISHBEIN,** Editor, *Journal of the American Medical Association*

**DR. RALPH W. GERARD,** Department of Physiology, University of Chicago

•

## SUGGESTED READINGS

BORSOOK, HENRY, and HUSE, WILLIAM, *Vitamins for Health.* "Public Affairs Pamphlets," No. 69. New York, 1942.

"Fitness for Freedom," *Survey Graphic*, March, 1942.

PAINTON, FREDERICK C., "There Is No Such Thing as Shell Shock," *Reader's Digest*, October, 1943.

STEARNS, MYRON M., "Pain Blackout," *Saturday Evening Post*, January 2, 1943.

[PRINTED IN U.S.A.]